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1.0 Introduction
Under the sponsorship and guidance of Professor John Hasseldine, I was able to start working on
this Honors Thesis titled: “A Case Study of Leveraged Buy-Outs” during the Summer and Fall
Semester of 2013. I managed to build a financial model of the LBO deal between Dell and Silver
Lake thanks to the help of my director and colleagues in the Investment Banking department
during my summer internship at Ho Chi Minh Securities Corporation. I also followed the
specific and detailed instructions from the Financial Modeling Course “Breaking into Wall
Street”, which was the core to my success in building and understanding this model.
1.1 Motivation for Thesis
With my Accounting and Finance degree from University of New Hampshire, I am aspiring to
work in a professional field where I can best apply my knowledge. My interest in investment
banking and M&A transactions stem from the well-known book “Monkey Business- Swinging
through the Wall Street Jungle”. Despite the harsh reality depicted in the book, investment
banking ignites my curiosity to break into this industry. My interest in this field was reinforced
throughout my investment banking internship with Ho Chi Minh Securities Corporation. One of
my most difficult tasks I was held responsible for was to build a valuation model (Discounted
Cash Flow model and Public Trading Comparables Analysis) for Viet Thai International Group
to assist in its sale of the two divisions: Consumer Lifestyle and SuperFood to foreign companies
in Thailand and Hong Kong. As an intern, I was also enrolled in Breaking into Wall Street’s
Financial Modeling self- study course. Throughout the course, I scrutinized its detailed
instructions on how to set up financial models and picked up a lot of information and technical
skills on how to evaluate a company during M&A deals and in this specific case study, the Dell-
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Silver Lake LBO deal. Investment banking requires a very strong knowledge and background in
accounting, therefore, conducting this case study is a very effective way for me to solidify as
well as improve my accounting and finance skills.
For the summer of 2014 after my graduation, I will be interning for PricewaterhouseCoopers in
their Tax practice and most of my time will be spent in the Financial Services – Alternative
group, where I will be conducting securities analysis and filing tax forms for clients in the Asset
Management Industry: Hedge funds, Mutual Funds and Private Equities. After the internship,
due to its flexibility, there might be demand in PwC’s Transaction Advisory Services/
Management Consulting practice. If I am given the opportunity to extend my work to a full time
offer and be able to rotate into new different groups, my experience in Investment Banking will
help me transition into PwC’s TAS group much smoother. This LBO case study will help me
gain more knowledge in the buy side of the finance world and enable me to showcase my
research, writing and technical skills.
1.2 Background on the deal
Since the financial crisis began in 2007/2008, the trend of large buyout deals started to halt.
Therefore, the $24 billion LBO deal between Dell and Silver Lake is one of the most current
high profile deals. It was announced on February 5, 2013 and the deal was eventually completed
on October, 29, 2013 with the total value was estimated to be at $24.9 billion. The unusual deal
structure comes from the fact that Michael Dell, the founder, owned 15% of the company and he
intended to roll over his stake, making the buyout for 85% of the company rather than the usual
100%. The most difficult aspect in building this model is the capital structure due to the huge
amount of cash overseas in addition to Michael Dell’s rollover.
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Since they have a large cash balance on their Balance Sheet, which is around 50% of the deal
value itself, to fund the deal, they are going to end up using a lot of the cash to fund the
transaction directly and effectively buy their own shares with that amount of cash.
One of the difficulties of building this LBO model as mentioned above is computing the complex
debt structure, with the contribution from Silver Lake, and combined with the fact that this
business is rolling over some shares and the repatriation of some of that overseas cash. Another
obstacle in constructing the model is the challenges posed from the projection of revenue and
expenses for Dell since the company has many different business lines, some of which are
declining like the revenues from desktops and notebooks business unit. However, other lines are
experiencing growth such as servers, networking, and some of Dell’s software divisions and its
goal is to turn itself around by moving away from its declining desktop PC and notebook
businesses and re-orienting itself toward software, services and tablets. Consideration will have
to be given to different revenue and expense scenarios on a segment by segment basis. The deal
also stood out for a few other various reasons:


Microsoft, who is a key strategic partner of Dell, joined the deal with a $2 billion
subordinated loan. This is unlikely for strategic partners to act this way by investing in
the capital structure of partner companies that are being taken private.



A letter from Southeastern Asset Management, one of Dell’s largest shareholders, was
published, stating the controversy that they believe Dell shares should be worth at least
$24 per share instead of the $13.65 per share offer from Silver Lake.



Acquisitions play a major role in this deal as Dell is not likely to turn itself around from
internal factors such as its organic growth. Therefore, an analysis of potential post-buyout
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acquisitions is needed and the margin and growth profiles are required for Silver Lake to
obtain an acceptable IRR.
There will be 5 main parts in building this LBO Model:
Part 1: Data Mining, Capital Structure and Model Setup
Part 2: Creating different Revenue and Expense scenarios.
Part 3: Completing Debt Schedules and LBO Analysis
Part 4: Building in support for Post – LBO Add-on Acquisitions
Part 5: Calculating Returns and Summary/Conclusion of Deal
In Part 1, “Transaction Assumptions,” “Debt Assumptions,” “Sources and Uses,” “Ownership
Percentages” and “Goodwill Creation and Purchase Price Allocation” sections will be created as
well as historical financial statements and trend analysis.
To gather the necessary data, I will have to comb through the company filings, investor
presentations, earnings call transcripts, industry reports and data from sources such as IDC, the
proxy statement , merger agreement, 8-K filings and filings from other parties involved, annual
10-K and quarterly 10-Q filings. Assumptions will have to be made on the capital structure as
well as the interest rates and principal repayment terms.
In Part 2, different scenarios need to be taken into consideration since there are various outcomes
possible for Dell. Three scenarios will be showcased: base, upside, downside and the Street
consensus. Revenue will be projected on a segment- by – segment basis and at least one of the
scenarios will approximate the Wall Street consensus thinking.
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In Part 3, I will link the mandatory repayments to the assumptions I set up in the beginning and
the company’s available cash flow each year. Optional repayments will be made in order of loan
seniority in the capital structure and I will handle all cases in my formula, including those where
revolver borrowing is required, those where no revolver borrowing is required and those where
the entire debt balance is paid off early. The interest expense calculated will be based off my
assumptions in the beginning and will flow directly into the Income Statement, creating a
circular reference. During the calculation for the five-year IRR, I will factor in all equity invested
by Silver Lake, as well as any additional equity invested over the years and capital used for
acquisitions. I will create sensitivity tables based on the four different scenarios, the post-buyout
acquisitions and more standard metrics such as purchase price, exit multiple and the percentage
of debt.
In Part 4, I will include support for two acquisitions for year 2 and year 4. Dell is unlikely to
grow its revenue organically. Therefore, it will need to acquire other companies to align to its
strategy over the past few years. I will build in support for post LBO acquisitions where I can be
able to adjust the purchase price and the form of payment (additional investor equity from Silver
Lake vs. debt) for both deals. Simple assumptions will be made for the debts that are in line with
those used in the LBO’s initial capital structure. Revenue and expenses for each acquisition will
be able to be adjusted and these can either stay constant or increase at a constant percentage each
year. Simple assumptions will also be made for the Balance Sheet and the Cash Flow Statement
and every acquired company’s EBIT will be tied to its purchase price, assuming an “effective
yield” and a margin. The revenue contribution will also be linked to the Operating Income and
this margin. I will look into some of Dell’s recent acquisitions and take into account the
additional debt repayment and interest expense from the LBO, as well as changes in other major
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cash outflows such as Capital Expenditure, dividends and share repurchases. My assumptions
will be in line with Dell’s previous acquisitions and with its financial capacity post-buyout.
In Part 5, I will calculate the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for investors, in this case, Silver Lake
partners and create sensitivity tables based on cases I will develop further on. A
summary/conclusion of the deal will be presented at the end along with recommendation as to
whether pursue this deal or not.
2.0 Data Mining, Capital Structure and Model Setup
For Part 1, when gathering information, I looked at Dell’s internal analyst presentation to get a
view of what the company is thinking in terms of their revenue growth, profitability growth and
other factors to build a model that not only matched these exactly but come up with different
scenarios and not just match their overly optimistic estimates.
Some important historical data I found include historical bids that various parties have been
engaged in with Dell. These actual proposals were from Blackstone and Carl Icahn. Blackstone,
however, later backed out after their initial bid. These bids were important as they helped me
later on when I weighed in on the valuation of Dell as in this case, there were just one buyer and
one seller with no additional bids.
2.1 Data Gathering
For equity research I went to TD Ameritrade through a friend because he has a brokerage
account registered with them. This gave me access to many free reports on Dell. For public
filings of public companies such as Dell, I went to edgar.sec.gov. However due to the complexity
and abundance of unnecessary information on this website, I decided to go to Dell’s company
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website at www.dell.com and looked at their Investor Relations section. This was where I pulled
essential data and information from their downloadable annual reports, 10-K, 10-Q, SEC filings.
For the investor presentations, I went to the “Investor Events and Webcasts” where I also
downloaded the earnings call transcripts.
For analyst presentations, they gave me a good insider view into how they think about the
business and what they project and use these information as a benchmark to see if my optimistic
case matched with the company estimates.
Moving on to bids from Blackstone group and Carl Icahn, it can be seen that some of them are
paying a different amount per share, $14.25 instead of $13.65. The BlackStone proposal initially
had Dell partially staying public as some shares would continue to be publicly traded on the
NASDAQ. Although these information will not be used directly, they will be useful under
“what-if” scenarios to possibly recommend alternatives when pitching the investment idea.
For Dell’s equity research reports, I also downloaded an All Equity Research Report from
“Thomson Reuters,” where I came across Morgan Stanley’s report where they had their own
investment thesis, with their own projections, Discounted Cash Flow model and this gave me
useful data about Dell’s historical market share and how its market share has changed in various
markets. In addition, this report helped for comparison purposes with projections and estimates
that I made during my Wall Street case projections.
Another major difficulty when building this model was the debt schedule. I was able to research
Dell’s existing tranches of debt and have simplified that in the model. For specific merger
documents, I went through the DEF14A filing, which is known as a proxy statement where I
found the discussion for the background of this merger. The information regarding the plans, the
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purpose, the covenants and agreements, the conditions for the merger, termination will only be
useful for lawyers working on the deal or bankers who are negotiating it. For the purpose of
modeling, I used the projected financial information and the financing the merger section
extensively. Some information from parts of the merger agreement was useful during treatments
of the company’s stock options and restricted stock units. The Dell LBO Financing section was
also important because it told me exactly where the source of finance, what the different tranches
of debt would be and what the interest rates were, what the principal repayment terms on those
would be. That was the end of my process in gathering data.
2.2 Transaction Assumptions
Moving on with Part 1, I made Transaction assumptions.

To figure out the “undisturbed share price”, I went on Google Finance and look at Dell’s share
price history on here. There was a massive jump between January 11th and January 14th and so I
picked the undisturbed share price of $10.88, from right before news of this potential LBO
buyout broke. Normally for M&A deals, analysts look at the price one day before or sometimes
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even 30 days before but in this case, I decided to go back as far as possible and to the date before
news of the buyout actually broke and people started speculating on it. In this case, it was
January 11th and the share price is $10.88 per share. The offer premium is calculated in
percentage and backwards from the price Silver Lake offered: $13.65 per share, which equals the
undisturbed share price multiply by one plus this 25.5% offer premium.
For the transaction close date, although it was really announced the beginning of February, it
certainly did not close then on February 1st, 2013. In real life, a major deal like this would take at
least six months to nine months and sometimes more than that to close. So if anything, it might
be more accurate to assume that this deal closes toward the end of their fiscal year 2014, or
sometimes between the period September to December 2013. However that will create a lot of
complications. Then, I will have a stub period and while it may be interesting to look at, it is
unrealistic to accomplish building the model in a short period of time. I simplified it and
assumed that it closes right at the end of Dell’s most recent fiscal year 2013.
Refinance existing debt is always an important issues with LBOs and even more so for Dell,
because they have a fairly unusual capital structure. I built an option here to set it to “Yes” or
“No”. I just set it to zero or one for the only allowable values. For the next part, normally in an
LBO model, there is a leverage ratio, which basically means that if I need $10 billion for this
deal and for instance, I have a 50% leverage ratio then that means I get 50% in the form of debt.
So that is $5.0 billion and then 50% in the form of equity from the PE, so another $5.0 billion.
However, because Michael Dell has this Founder rollover, he was contributing some of his own
cash from his own investment funds (technically his personal family office). Depending on how
much he contributed, I might end up getting to a negative equity contribution for Silver Lake.
Hypothetically, this is a $10 billion deal, and Michael Dell is rolling over $2.0 billion. If the
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leverage ratio of 80% is put in this cell, that would not give me the accurate numbers. Because an
80% leverage ratio would correspond to around $8.0 billion, and that means effectively Silver
Lake could contribute nothing and still get the deal done.
And if the leverage ratio is 90%, the situation would become worse because then Silver Lake
would end up contributing a ($1.0) billion, which obviously does not make sense. So the better
way to figure out the number is to base this on how much of a funding shortfall there actually is.
I looked at the purchase price, added in any debt that is necessary to refinance, or debt being paid
off, and then subtracted excess cash that the company is using, and then Michael Dell’s cash
contribution and how much he is rolling over.
That in turns told me, going down to the Sources and Uses schedule, how much I will have to
spend from all these different sources, how much debt I would have to take on, how much equity
Silver Lake is contributing. Although this is a bit of an unorthodox way, it is the only way to get
the model to work.

The share counts came straight from the 10-K. I went to search in the DEF14A Merger
Agreement and on page 10, it was stated that:
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“Michael S. Dell, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and The Susan
Lieberman Dell Separate Property Trust (together with Mr. Dell, the “MD Investors”), who
together have agreed, severally and not jointly, to transfer, contribute and deliver to Parent,
immediately prior to the consummation of the merger, 273,299,383 shares of the Common
Stock…”.
However, in page 4, it was stated that : “As of May 16, 2013, Mr. Dell and certain of his related
family trusts beneficially owned, in the aggregate, 274,434,319 shares of Common Stock…” I
wanted to simplify it and go with the number 274,434,000 shares. Technically this also included
a few options but I have ignored this for simplicity.
I started with the calculation of the diluted share, diluted equity value and enterprise value. Then
I got into funds required.
To get the full option schedule, I looked at the Dell Fiscal Year 2013 10-K Options RSU fillingsexcerpts and options outstanding.

Then I scrolled down and get the restricted stock awards, in which I was able to pull out the nonvested restricted stock balance, $42 million. Restricted shares do not have strike prices. They are
14 | P a g e

just normal shares that employees and management are restricted from selling for a certain time
period so I treated them as normal shares. In addition, due to the fact that the treatment to these
shares were discussed in the Merger Treatment of Options, RSUs :
“Will be canceled and converted into the right to receive an amount in
cash, equal to the product of the number of shares, times the amount that Silver Lake is offering
minus the actual exercise price of those options.” Then I looked carefully at the RSUs and
effectively it is something similar that they will be cancelled and converted into the right to
receive from the surround corporations an amount in cash equal to. By taking my common shares
and adding in the shares owned by the Found, I got 1.8 billion diluted shares. For the diluted
equity value calculation, I looked at the Balance Sheet and pulled information straight from there
for Cash and Cash equivalents. I ignored short-term investments since the number was
insignificant and added any existing debt.
On Dell’s actual Balance Sheet, there are many different tranches of debt. I looked at the Dell
10-K Existing Debt Excerpt and added all the different tranches of debt together and
consolidated it, even with the short term debt. Listing and tracking these separately does not add
anything to the model.
Non-controlling interest is something that always has to be added when calculating enterprise
value. Although very small, I included into the calculation of enterprise value. Preferred stock
will be zero and other liabilities that could potentially count toward enterprise value are also
zero. I calculated debt and equity value first. I took the number of diluted shares times the offer
price per share to get around $24 to $25 billion in diluted equity value. Enterprise value turned
out to be about $21 billion because Dell has so much excess cash on its Balance Sheet.
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For founder rollover, per the terms of the merger, I ignored a share valuation difference since it
is small. I went to the Merger Agreement and it stated:
“Mr. Dell, stating that he would consider reducing the valuation of his rollover shares to $13.36 a
s a means of preventing Silver Lake to increase its offer to $13.60.” Michael Dell’s investment
firm’s ( his family office) shares would only be valued at $13.35 per share as opposed to the
$13.65 being offered to the unaffiliated stockholders, in other words normal institutional
investors. The question arises is should I have taken that into account. I personally do not think it
is worthwhile. On a deal size of $24 billion or more, when taken into account all the funding
sources, the difference of around $100 million is relatively small so I ignored it in the interest of
simplicity. For the Founder rollover, I took the shares that Michael Dell currently owns and
multiply that by the offer price. I had to subtract the Founder rollover to get to the total funds
required because if he is rolling over shares, Silver Lake needs to buy 273 million less shares.
Because afterward Michael Dell will still own those shares and no fund needs to be transferred
because the ownership of those shares is not actually changing. From page 10 of the DEF14A
Agreement, Mr. Dell is to provide an additional $500 million into cash equity.
So he has this option to do it and then his own investment management firm has the ability to
provide an aggregative of up to $250 million in cash equity financing for the merger. There is
that option to contribute even more. In other words, other entities affiliated with and owned by
Michael Dell are contributing an additional $750 million.
Ultimately, the amount that Silver Lake will pay and the amount of debt that we need are both
going to be reduced by the fact that they are throwing in additional cash to purchase shares and
he is rolling over around $3.7 or $3.8 billion worth of existing shares.
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For EBITDA purchase multiple, I took the transaction enterprise value and divide by the trailing
12 months EBITDA, which I assumed is the 2013 fiscal year EBITDA, which equals 5.1x. I
assumed a baseline exit multiple 4.0x and then ranged my sensitivities around that.
The legal and miscellaneous fees are around $300 million, which is reasonable for a very large
buyout like this. Lawyers and accountants do cost a lot, especially when the deal requires parties
to work with them for months or years. For advisory fees, I took them as a percentage and
multiplied that by the equity purchase price. For financing fees, I took the percentage and then
multiplied by the amount of debt used. The LIBOR is set to 10000 units.
The last and most interesting part is what Dell will be doing with their overseas cash. In
Schedule 14A from the SEC, section LBO Financing, and they listed a couple of different
categories. Silver Lake is contributing around $1.4 billion in cash and then Michael Dell is
contributing $500 million plus up to $250 million additional, which is $750 million in total.
Microsoft is also contributing this $2.0 billion subordinating note at a 7.25% interest rate and
then up to $13.75 billion in debt financing. It is also assumed that Dell contributes $7.4 billion of
cash, to actually purchase its own shares an contribute to this leverage buyout, making it a fairly
unusual scenarios however that is also very commonly done with companies that have huge
excess cash balances like Dell does. This is actually one of the reasons that make this deal so
controversial.
Shareholders such as Southeastern Asset Management, Carl Icahn and others will look at this
and say instead of taking Dell private, and then owning a substantial portion afterwards and an
even more substantial portion, why not reward the actual shareholders, existing shareholders and
issue a dividend or return the cash to them in some other form. The problem is that when I went
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to their filings and took a look at their financial statements, most of this cash is overseas.
Therefore, if Dell is going to use it for the deal, they will have to pay some type of tax rate on it,
unless they could do something trickier. However, I assumed they do pay the standard tax rate on
repatriated cash for the U.S., which is around 35%. I assumed their minimum cash balance is
$3.0 billion and then I took their existing cash balance on their Balance Sheet and subtracted that
$3.0 billion to figure out how much Dell can put toward the deal. Then I took this cash and cash
equivalents of $12.5 billion and then subtracted the $3.0 billion minimum cash balance I have
assumed here so I get around $9.5 – 9.6 billion. Taxes paid and then I took this number and
multiply by the tax rate on this cash, and then after tax cash used. $9.5 billion minus the taxes
paid so $6.2 billion net cash amount to contribute towards the deal after taking into consideration
the tax effect on repatriated cash.
However, it is different because in the fillings, they are assuming $7.4 billion. They are also
completely ignoring this issue of taxes on overseas cash, which is something I could not do.
Later on, I discussed the accounting treatment for these taxes, which were essentially a loss.
Therefore, I treated this as a loss on the Balance Sheet and reduced shareholders equity directly
by this number to get the Balance Sheet to balance. It is unclear why, in the Merger Agreement,
they are completely ignoring this issue, but it does need to be taken into account, as the pre-tax
money cannot be used to fund a deal like this.
It has to be after-tax cash that has already been taxed in some way. For the effective tax rate, I
took the average effective tax rate historically of four recent years, which is lower than statutory
due to low tax regions overseas. The effective tax rate is calculated by taking the income tax
provision of each year dividing by pretax income of the respective year.
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For the excess cash, I ended up subtracting this, and I linked to the after tax excess cash and then
this got me to the funds required. I had $13.8 billion in total funds required which is roughly the
amount that Dell indicated in its fillings to be necessary to finance the deal. So for the debt used,
I linked this total funds required and multiplied by the percent debt used, which got me to $12.5
– 12.6 billion. This ended up excluding the revolver, which was why there was a slight
difference between this and the numbers that Dell quotes in its filings. Last part here, pro forma
TTM debt to EBITDA was calculated to be 5.3x. In addition, to mimic what the actual deal was
like, I set the “Refinancing Existing Debt” to “No”.
2.3 Debt Assumptions

Moving on to the debt assumptions section, I pulled the information regarding the interest rate
floor, principal repayment and other debt terms from the Merger Agreement on page 102. Silver
Lake’s contribution is $1.4 billion and there is $750 million additional from Michael Dell. Then
we have the 7.25% subordinated debt from Microsoft. Although the rollover is not mentioned,
Michael Dell is rolling around 273-274 million shares, along with the existence of 13.75 billion
worth of debt and $7.4 billion worth of cash. I also took into account the repatriation tax rate. If
the company needs to borrow extra, then there is usually a revolver and in this case, this revolver
is actually undrawn. With subordinating notes, there normally are no principal repayments, so
effectively I left the cell blank saying it is at 0.00%. There are other types of debt, and all the
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banks and lenders are listed in the Merger Agreement file. $4 billion is in term loan B, $1.5
billion in term loan C, $3.25 billion in first lien and second lien bridge facilities. Then there are
two items at the end, which are both effectively revolvers and/or commercial receivables
facilities. For the bridge loan business, they did not exactly split out what portion goes to the first
lien versus the second lien so I assumed that $2.0 billion is in the first and the $1.25 billion is in
the second lien. A bridge facility is essentially that the company borrows this money temporarily,
but ends up replacing it and refinancing it with some other types of debt financing after the
transaction closes, which can be understood as temporary funding. The $1.1 billion belongs to
the revolver and in this case, I assumed that commercial receivables facility would be undrawn.
The “$1.9 billion pursuant to a term/commercial receivables facility” did not relate to funding
the transactions and more of a working capital item.
For the term loan, the file told me about the interest subject to a floor of 2.0% and based on the
highest of primary, the overnight federal funds rate, plus 0.5% and the one month LIBOR rate,
plus 1.0% plus 2.5 %. The important thing to note is that “a LIBOR – based rate, subject to a
floor of 1.0%” means that the LIBOR cannot go below 1.0%. With term loan C, I took the
LIBOR – based rate subject to a floor of 1.0% plus 3.0% and the other important thing to extract
is the principal repayment so for the term loan B, it was 1.0% each year. It is not exactly clear
why they skipped term loan A but that is just the treatment. The ABL facility is an asset based
facility , with a LIBOR rate plus 1.75% with step downs and step-ups by 0.25%. They mentioned
that the for the bridge facilities, interest under the senior first lien bridge facility will equal initial
LIBOR – based rates, as selected by the bar subject to 1.0% floor plus 4.0% increasing by 50
basis points every three months thereafter up to a cap. However, there is no information about
what this cap is or over how long a time period this will last. Therefore, to make it simple, I
20 | P a g e

assumed the rate is LIBOR plus 4.0% with a LIBOR floor of 1.0%. Then it can be seen that any
loans not repaid will be converted into senior first lien term loans maturing seven years. All the
maturity dates of the debts were effectively not relevant in this case since I was only looking at it
over a five-year period. Anything less than five years, like the revolver, is simply going to be
refunded and redrawn and renegotiated from banks, so those need not to be factored in. Most
bridge facilities are refinanced and converted into something else later on and this automatically
converts into these senior first lien term loans.
2.4 Sources and Uses

The main difference between this LBO deal and typical M&A deals is the fact that a company is
contributing its own cash. Founder, Michael dell, contributes his own cash and rolls over some of
his own equity, and Silver Lake contributes some of its own. This is the PE standard “sponsor
equity contribution”, or in other words, what they are not paying for with debt. What they are
doing is instead, taking their own cash raised from limited partners (i.e. LPs) and using it for the
deal. The excess cash and then the rollover and additional cash contribution are going to be
under the Sources column, because they fund the deal. Under the Uses column, the main issue is
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paying the company itself all the outstanding shares, except for the ones that are being rolled
over and then refinancing any debt. “Assuming Existing Debt” is both a Source and a Use and
finally for the fees, these would count as Uses: the M&A advisory fees, the capitalized financing
fees and finally legal and miscellaneous fees. All of these are paid upfront in cash but the
difference is that the capitalized financial fees will become a balance sheet line time and then
amortized over time. The other two will be reflected right away effectively coming out of
Shareholder’s Equity on the transaction adjustments on the pro-forma Balance Sheet, and then
cash on the other side on the Balance Sheet.
For Sources, the revolver is undrawn initially so I assumed it would be $0. The other debt, term
loan B/C, the ABL facility and the bridge facilities and the subordinate note were linked from the
“Debt Assumptions” section. For the “Assume Existing Debt” line item, there are two options:
either to refinance it or assume it. If this cell were set to no, then I would assume it. If it were set
to yes, then I would have zero because the only option left would be to refinance. So the cell
formula = IF (debt finance…). If the names cell variable were set to one, then I would set this to
zero, otherwise I would set it to the company’s existing debt balance, which was the total
existing debt on the Balance Sheet. For the company’s excess cash, this is the after-tax cash
number that Dell is contributing from the repatriated cash. When they bring this cash back to the
U.S., they will be taxed on it and I have already reflected it in the section, with the 35% tax rate
for repatriated cash. By using the standard method which got both columns to match, Silver Lake
Investor Equity was calculated as a plug by adding up all the uses to arrive at Total Uses and
subtracting all the other Sources. So whatever was needed to spend to acquire Dell that has not
already been funded with cash or with a rollover or with the debt was what Silver Lake would
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have to contribute here.

The final thing is to look at the ownership percentages. Prior to the merger, Michael Dell owned
around 15% or 16% of the company. This number probably came from the fact that they
included some extra shares for various reasons so their number would end up higher than mine.
Post transaction, MD and then MSD Capital (i.e. his family office), in other words, those are
both Michael Dell and he ends up owning around 75-76%. Silver Lake will own the remaining
24$. For accuracy testing with my numbers, I took Michael Del’ shares, the Founder shares,
divided it by the diluted shares. Silver Lake owns 0.0% prior to the deal and then the institutional
investors own essentially one minus everything else so this added up to 100% pre-deal.
Post-deal, Michael Dell’s ownership is no longer limited to those 274 million shares. It is equal
to the cash contribution for equity, plus his rollover divided by the cash contribution, plus his
rollover, plus Silver Lake’s contribution. In other words, I took his own equity contributions,
then dividing by all equity contributions which consisted of his plus Silver Lake’s. Therefore, his
ownership jumped from 15% to 75%, almost 76%, which really annoyed existing shareholders.
He has the potential to make a lot more profit if the company does well if the turnaround works
out and existing shareholders do not get the opportunity to participate in any of this potential
upside. So that is part of the reason why they were so annoyed about it and the whole reason why
it is possible is because of this excess cash balance. This amount of cash is so substantial and
since the company has so much excess cash, they simply do not need as much in the form of debt
or in the form of Silver Lake’s own equity. As a result, Michael Dell can get away with rolling
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over what he owns and putting in some extra and owning by far the majority of the company.
Institutional investors will own nothing assuming that the deal gets done and Silver Lake will
own the rest, which is around 24-25%.
This is a very interesting deal in which with most leverage buyouts, usually institutional
investors will own 80-90% of the company and then afterwards the private equity firm will own
80-90% of the company. Here by contrast, it is something completely different. Silver Lake, a
PE company owns a minority of the company, under 30% and Michael Dell owns around three
quarters of the company.
2.5 Purchase Price Allocation

I am paying $24-$25 billion for the company but going down to their Balance Sheet, if their
shareholder equities have only $10-$11 billion, and I have a giant gap in our Balance Sheet.
Because I wiped out this shareholder equity as part of our pro-forma Balance Sheet transaction
adjustments, I ended up replacing it with $25 billion worth of debt, of equity, of changes in cash,
etc. Therefore, I had a change of $10-$11 billion versus a change of $25 billion and it was
obvious to see that the Balance Sheet was going to simply go out of balance. I plugged that gap
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by creating goodwill, which reflected the premium over Dell’s book value that Silver Lake has
paid for and then I would make some other adjustments. I might adjust the values of other assets
and I was going to end up creating intangible assets as well. For the seller’s book value, an
important notice is that under new accounting rules and standards, shareholder equity is actually
split out different from other items, such as preferred stock and non-controlling interests and in
this specific case, founder equity , what Michael Dell owns and then sponsor common equity,
which is what Silver Lake owns. In an LBO scenario like this, I did not want to write down the
entire equity section but just the shareholders equity.
I was also going to write off the existing goodwill. It is essential to reset the goodwill on Dell’s
Balance Sheet. I had a $23 billion premium to allocation. Another question that comes up was
how much would this $23 billion go to goodwill versus other items like the write ups and the
write downs. For PP&E write up, it was somewhat of an arbitrary process to figure out the
number. The approach I took was to go to Dell’s historical acquisitions over the most recent
fiscal years. From the Acquisition Information of their Filing Excerpts, they gave me the total
amount Dell was allocating to amortizable and tangible assets and then the total amount for
goodwill, but no information was given on the write up or purchase price. However, by looking
at the number, intangible assets are around $2.1 billion. The total cost they paid is around $5.0
billion which means that about 40% of this went to intangible assets. I assumed that 40% of this
purchase price, this purchase premium went to intangibles and I could calculate everything based
on that and assumed something lower for the PP&E write up, approximately 10%. This is the
standard assumption as it just reflects that usually the market value of real estate, of buildings
generally increases over time. However, on the Balance Sheet, it is recording that historical cost,
minus accumulated depreciation.
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The problem with the 40% for intangibles was that this number corresponds to the total price in
their fillings. The proper way to think about this problem is to look at the total price that Silver
Lake is paying, so the $24 billion pertained to this price and then actually applied the 40% to that
number. However, I would end up with an unreasonably high number so I knocked it down to
20% instead. In real life for similar LBO deals, when the deal is about to close, there will be
accountants at Big Four firms or other people who work at valuing these types of intangible and
tangible assets, they will come in and make some type of estimates.
For the period of PP&E and intangible assets, the standard assumption is to use eight years for
the PP&E period and for the amortization period for intangibles, I can use five years.
When I looked at their previous acquisitions, the weighted average useful life was around 6.1
years so my assumption of five years seemed to be reasonably accurate. The other thing to keep
in mind is that Dell, as a company, is much different from some of these smaller software
companies that they acquired. Dell is probably going to have far less in intangible assets than a
peer software or services company would have, because Dell has more manufacturing
capabilities, more hard assets. That is another reason why I reduced this 40% to 20% instead.
For the purchase price to allocate, I linked this to the purchase premium. For the intangible write
up amount, I multiplied this 20% times the purchase price to allocate and this would be
amortized over five years. For the PP&E, I took the 10%, multiply by the existing PP&E
balance, net PP&E. This would be amortized over eight years.
I then moved on to the calculation of the goodwill. The write up of PP&E was subtracted
because this was going to cause the asset side to increase. Due to this increase, I would need less
goodwill to plug the gap. I subtracted the write up of intangibles as well. The write down of the
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deferred tax liabilities was left blank as this item did not exist pre-transaction. There was this one
line item, the long term deferred tax liability that actually got created in this transaction so I put
in a zero for the write down of DTL in the interest of simplicity. For the new DTL, it was equal
to the write up amounts (PP&E and intangibles) times their tax rate. I added this amount to the
liability side, increasing the amount of goodwill required to plug the gap, which made the
Balance Sheet balance.
Now I took our allocable purchase premium, added up everything and got to $19 billion of
goodwill. For the financing fees, these also get capitalized and amortized over time and for the
financing fee period, and I assumed it would be five years based on the average life span, the
average tenure of all these different debt tranches. That ends the Part 1 of the LBO case study.
3.0 Creating different Revenue and Expense scenarios
3.1 Servers & Networking, Desktops and Laptops
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I jumped into Dell’s revenue and expenses and looked at the different segments of their
business, as well as other scenarios that I would set up to allow me to look at what the business
be like over the next four to five years, under different assumptions. Dell has six main segments
and I will address the first three of them now: Severs & Networking, Desktops and Laptops.
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The questions outlined are as following:
1. Where do I find the data (review of documents)?
2. Project on customer basis or product/service basis?
3. Unit sales and ASPs or market share and market growth rates?
4. How to size the market using historical data, IDC, and Dell’s filings?
5. How to project the market size of each segment in future years
6. Market share cases for Servers & Networking
7. Market share cases for Mobility (Laptops)
8. Market share cases for Desktop PCs
9. Putting it all together to calculate revenue
I also looked at how my numbers compare to the consensus estimates, to what Wall Street
analysts were thinking and also to what the company was thinking, and to some of the more
downside and pessimistic case type scenarios.
I looked into the Dell – FY 2013 Q4 Financials as it gave me some extremely useful data such as
a market share for desktop PC’s and portable PC’s or laptops, going back to 2003 all the way up
through 2012. This told me exactly how its market share has changed over time. The Dell
Consensus Estimates Excel file gave me the Wall Street consensus estimates at the time the deal
was announced for Dell’s revenue, over the next year and the year beyond that as well, which I
notice that it stayed relatively flat.
From the Dell FY 2012 Analyst Day Presentation, although it did not disclose operating income
by business segment in an useful way, it did tell me that less than 50% comes from enterprise
and over 50% comes from end user computing and Dell wanted to shift this in the future. This
30 | P a g e

data point proved very useful to me as I completed this analysis. Equity research reports have
very useful data, one of which is from Jefferies, which has some information about the total
shipments in all these different markets. The one from Credit Suisse, although was older
compared to the time the deal was announces, gave me an estimate of margins by segment,
which proved to be useful in the future.
Moving on, I looked at the Dell internal financial projections and this was part of the Merger
Agreement. Dell actually hired the Boston Consulting group, one of the top three consulting
firms in the world, to come in and create all these different cases about Dell’s revenue estimates.
However, it did not end up being that useful because it was too high level. They only gave us
revenue, gross margin and operating income. The operating income was non- GAAP, which
means I did not know what they were adding back in terms of amortization and other charges.
There were some indications however, unless I saw the specific numbers, I could not be sure of
it.
The final document, called the Dell Case Study Channel Check, is a collection of comments
when people working on the buy side and private equity, at hedge funds and asset management
firms go out in the field and speak with key distributors, suppliers, retailers, customers and
sometimes via contacts with connections on LinkedIn.
The next decision I needed to make was do I project this on a customer basis or a product and
service basis. In this case, it was most useful to project it on a product basis. Based on the
filings, it was grouped by business unit, which effectively meant the type of customer they have.
They not only gave us the revenue but also the market share and the operating income by
different business units so there was no calculations needed. However, if I did not set the model
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up like this, and if I did not follow these specific business units, enterprises, SMB, public and
consumer, I was never going to be able to figure out the operating income by each of the six
business segments mentioned earlier. Therefore, I would have to come up with a much higher
level view of expenses, but on the revenue side, it made the most sense to do so. One of the
reasons why I prefer to do this was because each of these different segments has a very different
story around it. The big story is that laptops and desktop sales around this time are falling off
dramatically because tablets are taking over. This was proven by the shipment data collected
from the equity research reports. There has been a big falloff overall in notebooks, netbooks,
desktops going from $344 million in 2010 to only $330 million. Meanwhile tablet shipments
have gone up from zero to 125 million in only the span of few years. The bottom line is that each
of these segments will tell a very different story.
With servers and networking, they are growing quite a bit because they made some good
acquisitions and there is a huge demand for servers, mainly because of the move to cloud
computing. Service is going up because Dell is emphasizing this increasingly and selling more
and more bundled service deals. Software and peripherals happen to be staying in the same spot.
But it is very important to look how each of them is moving in different direction. The main
trend really is that consumer spending is falling and this is driven by the shift to tablets.
Therefore, when making rough estimates for expenses later on, I projected them on the basis of
unit sales and average selling price (ASP) or market share and market growth rates. For the
mobility, on other words laptop and desktop segments, Dell gave me directly all the market
shared data publicly. Desktop went from 17% -18% to 12% and laptops went from 16-18% to
10-12% so the trend was definitely one of falling market share. Furthermore, I wanted to make
sure in my projections that this trend continues in future years. The question was how to figure
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out the total market size. I took Dell’s market share or take their revenue from mobility and then
divide by the market share for that segment and that would back me into the total market size for
the segment. On how to project the market size of each segment in future years, I started with
the market size and then my cases were going to revolve around Dell’s market share. I could
assume a constant market share then assume that the market itself grew at higher or lower rates.
To get the view of how these markets were going to change over time, I perused the Channel
Checks document again and went to the section that had Comments and Overall Market Size and
Growth. Accordingly, the growth for desktops and laptops is modest and Windows 8 just came
out around this time but spending is probably going to be flat after that until the next major
release. Then based on the comments, some companies are planning to increase spending
aggressively servers because big data is becoming more important. Cloud computing, where
everything is store on these servers and then accessed remotely by employees and customers is
becoming very important and it is a huge trend. For mobility, I assumed slight higher growth in
the coming years as because with laptops in many cases, they are often creating hybrid tablet
laptop-type computers so I assumed a slight increase here and then a slightly lower number for
desktop growth.
The bottom line is servers and networking is growing by a modest amount. The other segments
are either staying flat or increasing a little bit.
For steps number six, seven and eight as detailed in the outline, I went through the market share
cases for the three main segments of Dell. For servers and networking, the trend is increasing
market share growth over time. I went to the Channel Checks document to look at the servers
and networking segment. The overall key takeaway is that Dell may not have much pricing
power, but companies like them because of their integrated solutions and add on service.
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Based on a quote from the research, an IT manager from a Fortune 500 Company said that he
would not be surprised by the 20% market share and even smaller companies are expecting to
buy more servers because they are moving more and more of their data and other processing
functions in-house. These results show that I was going to be a little more optimistic with my
projections, however, not hitting that 20% level because it is still a substantial increase.
Assumptions for growth rate were then made for upside, downside and the Street consensus case.
For Mobility and Desktop PCs, I looked back to the Channel Checks. It is very difficult to do a
traditional retail check because these are sold directed at customers. Therefore, it is not possible
to go to a large retailer and necessarily ask about this, because so many of their sales come in
from direct channels. The Wall Street consensus estimate is that their market share is going to
decline by at least a few percentages points over five years. In addition, the common trend is that
consumers are not expected to increase or decrease their spending by very much. This indicates
that the base case should probably be in the same range as it was historically and maybe even
declining a little bit because one common issue that has been cited above is the lack of pricing
power on the part of Dell. Assumptions for growth rate were then made for the conservative,
upside and the Street consensus case.
3.2 Revenue Model Part 2: Storage, Services , and Software & Peripherals
On balance, these are all less significant than the first three that we looked at, for servers and
networking, laptops and desktops. The reason is simply in that they are smaller in terms of size
and unlike the servers and networking segment, which is growing at a fairly good rate compared
to everything else here and unlike the mobility and desktop segments which are falling at a good
clip, these are not going to be changing quite as much. There will be some growth overall in the
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services segments, because it is an area that Dell has certainly been emphasizing over the past
few years and historically over the past three or four years, it has grown by a good amount.
However, on some of the others like Storage, I would end up not having enough information to
make solid judgments on. For software and peripherals, because of the way Dell lists their
revenue and breaks out things, it was be once again somewhat difficult to come to a solid view
on this. I made the following detailed outline for this revenue model:
1. Logic behind Services revenue
2. How to project the backlog and % recognized each year
3. Software & Peripherals projections
4. Storage revenue projections
5. Adding up total revenue
I will discuss the logic behind how I projected the services revenue because it is more than just a
simple percentage growth rate and I will be looking at other factors as well. Once I go through
the logic, I will mention how to actually project it by going into some details behind the revenue
recognition for deferred revenue and their IT services backlog. Then I will look at the software
and peripherals projections and then the storage revenue projections. Both of these are
effectively going to be simple percentage growth rates as storage revenue is such a small
percentage of the total that it does not even matter what assumptions I pick for it. As mentioned
before, I want to ground my projections especially the Street consensus case.
For the projections, I pulled in the numbers for the services revenue from the filings along with a
couple of other metrics such as deferred revenue from warranties and then contracted services
backlog. From the Dell 2013 Fiscal Year 10-K Services Backlog document, it is said that:
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“Estimated services backlog represents signed contracts that are initially $2.0 million or more in
total expected revenue with initial contract term of at least 18 months.” Essentially these were
the sum total of contracts that are all worth over a certain amount, $2.0 million in this case.
It was not exactly clear what the correlation was between something like this, the backlog and
then the services revenue that got recognized. However, there had to be some correlation. The
way this works is very simple in that a company will sign up customers for services like this and
often as is the case with Dell, they will be recognized over many years. So a portion of this will
get recognized as revenue. Now they may pay for these upfront in cash or it may be a
combination of both where they pay a portion upfront and then a portion over time in cash. But
regardless of the treatment, the point is that they amass a certain amount in signed contracts and
then they recognize those over time, as they actually deliver the service according to the rules of
revenue recognition from accounting. For the deferred revenue from warranties, I searched for
the numbers in the 10-K filings. With this one, the idea is that whenever Dell sells some of its
product: laptops, desktops, servers, etc., the customers will have the option to purchase a
warranty with it. The warranty covers accidental damage, it covers the computer breaking over a
certain time period and then customers get reimbursed for it. Just as with any other type of
services revenue, even if the customer pays for it all in cash up-front, the company cannot
recognize it as revenue because they have not actually delivered the service that the warranty
guarantees. Therefore, this has to be recognized over time as well.
The bottom line is that I assumed here was that the services revenue was going to be closely
related to both of these and that effectively was just going to be a percentage of the prior year’s
total backlog. I was going to take a look at how much deferred revenue from warranties, what
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their backlog was in the prior year and then I assumed that going forward, it was going to be very
closely linked to that number.
For more research, I went to their earning calls for the 2013- Q4. On page 3, the CFO presented:
“The services backlog and deferred services revenue increased 3.0% to $16.3 billion.” This
number was roughly in the same range with the $15.8 billion I had in my excel spreadsheet.
More interestingly, they said right after: “New services signings increased 9.0% to $2.1 billion
on a trailing 12-month basis”. With something like services revenue, I had whatever got
recognized from the prior year and then I had the new signings in this year. I would take my
services revenue, which was $8.3 – 8.4 billion and recognize a portion of this number as services
revenue this year and add to this backlog with the total number of signings in this year. Some of
these might actually be recognized as revenue. I added this number to my backlog and then I
reduce my backlog by however much that got recognized as revenue. Then I reflected that as
revenue ultimately on the income statement. That is the logic behind it.
I finished explaining step 1, which was the logic behind the services revenue. For the actual
projections and where to come up with these numbers, I could simple take the historical average
of the last three fiscal years. It is decreasing overall but from the numbers, it is far from clear that
it is a definite trend in one direction or the other. For a judgment like that, I would need more
like five to ten years’ worth of data. Therefore, I took the average and carried this across. For the
services backlog growth, I turned to the Channel Checks. The services segment has been one of
the faster growing segments and a lot of people in the Channel Checks document talked about
Dell’s expansion overseas and how a lot of the overseas vendors in territories outside the U.S.
are simply not as good or not as well known for providing these types of services. People also
mentioned that Dell is really good at selling these warranties and valuated services presumably,
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if they are talking about the enterprise clients that Dell has here. Again, after reading through
some of the analysts’ presentations and transcripts from those presentations, I noticed when they
talked about how expanding services will be one of their top priorities. In the analyst’s day
presentation, some of Dell’s goals between 2012 and 2016, whether or not these are reasonable is
up for debate but Dell is aiming to grow at an average annual growth rate of 6.0%.
Meanwhile, as their core business has either declined or stagnated, it must be a very important
priority. On the basis of all these events, I can guess that the growth rates should be solid because
it is one of the company’s priorities and is something everyone in the Channel Checks has
highlighted, as something Dell is focused on and something they plan to spend additional
funding on.
Assumptions for growth rate were then made for the four cases: the base, upside, downside and
the Street consensus case.
3.3 Expenses Scenarios:
In this part, I looked to create different scenarios for cost of goods sold (COGS), and operating
expenses (OpEx). The company does not break it out in a way that shows after COGS and after
OpEx, how much pre-tax profit and before interest expense they are actually generating. Due to
the lack of detailed information after looking into the breakdown of segment-by-segment in the
10-K, I looked at COGS as a percent of revenue and OpEx as a percent of revenue and assumed
that the margins of the company will increase in more optimistic scenarios as they move into
more of a software and services business. On the other hand, if they stay more in the hardware
realm, their margins are going to continue to decrease because they will lose pricing power.
They will still be able to sell their products but their margins will simply be lower. Because of
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the mark-up, the difference between how much they are paying for products to manufacture then,
to get the parts and supplies and then sell them, will decrease over time. I started out with COGS
and took a look at the historical percentages and at the Channel Checks document. Most people
seem to think that prices will keep falling on the hardware side. The current markup percentages
that Dell has will be difficult to maintain which supported what I just mentioned before. Then
with the software and services, yet the margins were higher. The problem is that a lot of this
revenue for Dell is coming from companies they have acquired, that are still in growth mode so
their margins inevitably are going to be lower. I looked at these numbers as a percent of revenue
and did not look specifically at the margins.
Assumptions were then continued to be made for the basic four cases.
3.4 Income Statement Projections and Footing my numbers
In this part, I calculated everything down to net income and EBITDA at the bottom of the
Income Statement and finally at the end, I compared my numbers to analyst estimates to some of
Dell’s own internal financial projections as well as some figures from the Boston Consulting
Group that were created as part of a process where Dell hired the group to advise them on this
deal and look at potential scenarios. One notice during my calculation was the when I have taken
the average of the previous four fiscal years of Dell for the tax rate, Dell’s effective tax rate is
lower than their statutory rate of 35% or 40%. The reason is that a lot of their operating
subsidiaries are overseas. Furthermore, many of these regions have lower tax rates or they are
taking advantage of some legal loopholes and tricks to effectively pay lower taxes. In any case, I
went with the effective tax rate because that is what Dell is really expected to pay over future
years. Calculations for EBITDA were then made for the forward years. Assumptions for the
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four basic cases are shown in the excel spreadsheet. When I went into the Internal Financial
Projections document from Dell, the numbers from the Boston Consulting Group with 25% of
expected cost savings and in another case 75% basically meant Dell hired them to come in and
recommend areas to cut costs. Based on the results, my projections seemed more optimistic than
BCG’s but it did not seem like I was wildly off the mark with what third party sources like BCG
were saying about the deal. Looking at the equity research report conducted by Morgan Stanley,
the general trajectory of their numbers generally matched up to what I had.
3.5 Balance Sheet Projections
I will explain the logic behind assumptions for Balance Sheet drivers and then I will look at the
historical trends and come up with numbers in the future based on those trends and what I know
about Dell’s business model, as well as the comments from customers and suppliers in the course
of the Channel Checks. For the actual projection of the Balance Sheet, I started with current
assets then moved to long term assets, then current liabilities and then finally long term liabilities
and equity at the end. I made the accounts receivable a percent of revenue. Essentially accounts
receivable represents the cash payments from customers that Dell is waiting on. Dell has already
delivered the service or product to them and I assumed that they are going to pay Dell, because
Dell has sent the invoice but still waiting for the actual cash payment. Accounts receivable will
always follow sales because generally speaking, unless the company has changed its policies or
its business model, it is usually going to stay in a slightly tight range and will increase as sales
increase. For the provision for doubtful accounts, this essentially represents the amount that the
company is not likely to receive of these cash payments that it is waiting one. It represents a
contra-asset and is netted against the gross AR to get the get AR, which is what most companies
show on their Balance Sheet. Because as a company gets bigger, as the business grows, it is
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going to be sending out more invoices and perhaps not receiving them back in cash, so the
provision for those so-called doubtful accounts is going to increase over time. Another item that
was a little more specific to Dell is the short term financing receivables, which is one of the line
items on the Balance Sheet. This is because Dell offers customers the option to pay in
installments and other sorts of offers where customers can pay in credit and then actually pay in
cash later on. All of these were going to be linked to sales. For inventory and COGS, these
would be very closely liked as this is typical for hardware or manufacturing companies. Because
as the company amasses inventory, it only records it as COGS, once that inventory is turned into
finished products and actually sold. Prepaid expenses are generally linked to operation expenses
and not as closely linked to COGS. With short term and long term deferred revenue, they are
always going to follow sales to some extent. Finally, depreciation/amortization was calculated as
a percent of revenue. It would be better to have a full PP&E schedule but I made this assumption
as I had four different cases and I wanted to ensure it stays in roughly the same range.
Amortization of existing tangibles came from the company’s own schedule and their filings.
From then, I estimated the number in future years based on historical trend and most of these are
filled up by using the average. After that, I projected and linked the Balance Sheet numbers,
starting with current assets and going all the way down.
3.6 Cash Flow Statement Projections
I started by projecting the cash flow from operations at the top then moved into cash flow from
investing and then cash flow from financing and some of the changes in debt. I left out the debt
schedules because I will address this part in the later section. The top line Net Income flowed in
from the Income Statement. Depreciation of existing PP&E would be pulled from the PP&E
schedule later on. Amortization of existing intangibles would be coming from Dell’s own filings.
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The FX rate effect is difficult to predict therefore, I took the simple average. The deferred
income taxes were calculated as a percentage of book taxes or taken from the Book vs. Cash Tax
schedule. All the items that belong in the Changes from Operating and Assets and Liabilities
flowed in directly from the Balance Sheet. Items from Cash flow from Investing are
unpredictable, therefore I took the simple historical average and zero-ed out maturities/purchases
of short-term investments as well as acquisition of businesses, as those two are just there for
robustness. Items from cash flow from Financing are also zero-ed out because they were purely
there for robust model. When doing the Balance Sheet adjustments, I reduced Cash and Cash
equivalent as they were used to finance the deal. The net PP&E was increased due to the write up
and I wrote down existing goodwill and added in new Goodwill. The adjusted intangible assets
reflected the intangibles write-up and new capitalized financing fees were added before
computing the long-term assets. For term loan B in the long-term liability section, I added new
debt balances from LBO. For shareholder’s equity in the equity portion, I wiped out the old
figures, subtracted legal/advisory fees and reflected taxes paid on repatriated cash.
4.0 Completing Debt Schedules
4.1 Mandatory Debt Schedules
For setting up the debt schedules, I calculated the Sources of Funds and Revolver Borrowing, the
Mandatory Debt Repayment, the logic behind the debt repayment formulas and calculations for
Total Mandatory Repayments.
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One thing to notice is for the revolver borrowing, how it works is that if I have mandatory debt
repayments that I cannot meet with my subtotal before revolver ( i.e. mandatory debt repayments
exceed subtotal before revolver), in other words however much in cash plus cash flow I have
available to use to repay debt with. In that case, I would have to borrow something on the
revolver and it is like how credit card repayments often work for individuals. If I have bills
coming in and I cannot actually meet them with my monthly income after expenses, I may need
to borrow something in the short term and take out some debt on my credit card to pay for it.
That is the same thing with companies and how revolvers are really used for. If they cannot meet
their mandatory debt obligations, they may need to borrow something extra temporarily and then
pay it back when they have additional cash flow.
Moving on to step two on how to do the mandatory debt repayment, I started with the total
existing debt and used a MIN formula. I am saying that Dell is going to either repay the
minimum amount or if the total amount of existing debt is less than this, then I will just pay off
that total remaining amount of debt. The data could be pulled out either from page 83 of the 1043 | P a g e

K or from the Filing Excerpts and the estimated mandatory repayments would be laid out there.
For the MIN formula which is = MIN (Prior Year Debt, Beginning Balance * Yearly
Amortization), a simple explanation is : If the Prior Year Debt = 400, Beginning Balance = 500
and Yearly Amortization = 10% , then repay 50 since 50 < 400. If Prior Year Debt = 20,
Beginning Balance = 500, Yearly Amortization = 10%. Repayment is 20 since 20<50.
4.2 Optional Debt Schedules

The same MIN formula applied to these optional debt schedules, to check the balance so far
versus what I started with in the annual repayments. This time around, I had to put in a few
additional checks to handle cases where I borrowed and draw on the revolver. In addition, I had
to factor in however much I have actually spent so far on the mandatory repayments. To
calculate the total optional repayment total, I used the MAX/MIN formula = MAX (MIN ( Prior
Year Revolver , Cash Flow Available – Debt Repaid So Far), 0 )
The basic formula here is I am taking the MIN between the prior year revolver and then the cash
flow available to repay it minus the debt that I have repaid so far, then minus whatever cash flow
I have actually used to repay debt both on mandatory and optional repayments so far. Then
around it is the MAX and zero part. To understand how this works, I will basically illustrate
three cases. For case number one, I will assume the revolver is $100 in the prior year. My cash
flow available is $100 and I have repaid, so far $50 worth of debt. I repay $50 because $100
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minus $50 equals $50, which is less than $100. In this case, I am really just working with that
MIN formula on the inside. And prior year revolver is $100 cash flow available minus debt
repaid so far is $50. $50 is less than $100 and so I, therefore, pay what I can on that revolver
balance.
Case number two, I will say the revolver is $20 and my cash flow available is $100. I have
repaid $50 so far. In this case, I do not want to repay $50 because I would end up with a negative
revolver. Instead, I repay $20, which is less than $50 so once again, I am just working with that
MIN formula on the inside. The first two cases are straightforward and match what I went
through with the mandatory repayments.
For the last case, let’s say my revolver is $100. My cash flow available is $100, but I have repaid
$120 of debt so far. What this means is that I have had to borrow something on my revolver. I
have had to borrow $20 extra on my revolver to simply make these debt repayments of $120 so
far. In this case, I would repay $0, which is less than negative ($20). The prior year revolver is
$100. Cash flow available minus debt repaid so far, that becomes ($20), because $100 minus
$120 is negative ($20) so I have the minimum between zero and negative ($20). In that case, the
minimum is ($20) since it is less than $0. However, we have the MAX zero formula on the
outside, making it $0. To simply put it, if the inside is negative that means I have borrowed
something on the revolver and therefore I am not going to repay anything optionally, because I
simply cannot do so. I have no extra cash flow. I could not even meet my minimum mandatory
repayment requirements without drawing on my revolver so therefore, I cannot repay anything
optionally and this is going to default to zero.
To finish this part, I entered the formulas for Term Loan B and C and the rest effectively are all
zero. Then I calculated the total and the cash generated and the uses of the fund.
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Up next, I linked everything together on the cash flow statement and recalculated the interest
expense and filling that of the balance and that takes me to the end of my debt schedules
coverage.
5.0 Building in support for Post-LBO Add-on Acquisitions
I will factor in post LBO acquisitions in this buyout model and this case study specifically.
Dell is unlikely to grow revenue significantly on their own, which is true from the model I have.
It is growing up by almost nothing over the five years. Therefore, I will incorporate two
acquisitions, one in Year 2 and one in Year 4. Creating full schedules would be very time
consuming and tedious because these are going to be relatively small acquisitions.
I would need to be able to adjust the purchase price and the form of the payment, either in the
form of additional investor equity from Silver Lake or debt from both deals. I made simple
assumptions for debt and made them in line with the LBO’s original capital structure. I assumed
a slight premium on the interest rates because I would have a lot more debt on Dell’s Balance
Sheet after the LBO. I factored in the revenue and expenses and assumed fairly simple
percentage growth rate. For expenses, I assumed constant margins as well as simple assumptions
are made for Balance Sheets and Cash Flow Statement combinations. I also looked at what kind
of revenue and EBIT or operating income multiples Dell has paid for companies in the past and
assumed something similar going forward. It is quite subjective but the main thing is I made sure
my assumptions had to be in line with their previous acquisitions.
Ownership percentage is where I had the first significant change. I had ownership percentages at
exit. Because as a result of putting in additional equity, Silver Lake’s ownership of the company
changed by the end of the transaction. When they go and sell the company, their ownership
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percentage will be different. To find out information on previous acquisitions, I looked into two
good sources. Source number one, I went back to one of Dell’s analyst presentations, on page 17
of their 2012 presentation, a lot of information was found on some of their previous acquisitions,
everything from IRR to the total cash used to fund M&A transaction from 2008 to 2012 and total
number of companies acquired. The fact that they are saying $10.3 billion was used to acquire
companies from these four-five years tells me that if I have acquisition spending in the range of
$2.0 billion per year, that amount would be reasonable as it is around the historical average over
the past four or five years. Now in my case, I assumed only two companies got acquired for
simplicity. I wanted to pay the most attention to the total amount of spending over the period and
the post-acquisition revenue. This number is harder to incorporate directly because companies
grow over time. From the information, it could be inferred that I am getting about $1.0 billion in
revenue for each $1.0 billion spent on M&A deals, or maybe a little less than that number. For
the second source, I went to the Filings Excerpts and looked under the acquisition information,
where they have information about their acquisition of Quest, SonicWALL, Wise Technologies
and the most useful part is where they give a mini purchase-price allocation schedule. It gave me
the estimated cost that has been allocated to intangibles, to in-process R&D, to cash to AR,
goodwill, deferred revenue and the total amount they have spent, which is around $5.0 billion.
On the second page of the acquisition section, I found the pro-forma net sales and net income,
which basically means, if these acquisitions had happened at the start of 2013 and closed around
then, the numbers for the company’s revenue and net income would have been as what is shown.
Interestingly, revenue would have been higher than I might expect but net income would have
actually been lower, which means these companies Dell acquired actually resulted in negative
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net income. This is not surprising as the acquired companies were in their early stages and their
growth modes were probably not as profitable as Dell.
From then, I made estimations for PPA and assets/liabilities, revenues and EBIT contributions
from previous acquisitions. I assumed that Dell would spend $1.5 billion to acquire the first
company Year 2 and $2.0 billion for its second acquisition in Year 4.
The completed excel screenshots for assumptions and calculations are presented as below:
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6.0 Calculating Returns
For the final part of the financial model, I calculated the returns to the Silver Lake partners and
created three main sensitivities tables with analysis of key variables in this acquisition.
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Based on the sensitivity analysis charts, I came to the conclusion that the deal looks good in Base
Case but resembles a disaster in Conservative and Street consensus cases. Even with substantial
decline in market sizes, numbers could work but were extremely sensitive to changes in margins
and 1-2% difference in Operating Income could result in 15-20% IRR difference. Furthermore,
there is very little insight into Operating Income or margins by segment. More leverage would
definitely help but not much in most cases. Acquisitions are almost a non-factor because they
slightly reduce IR due to low yields and additional equity required.
7.0 Summary/Conclusion of the Deal
7.1 Executive Summary:
My recommendation goes against the decision of Silver Lake acquiring Dell in a Leverage
Buyout ( LBO ) transaction due to the lack of insight into Dell’s margin and a significantly low
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“margin of safety”. Even if Dell’s market shares falls or its key markets decline by close to 50%
over the next five years, I could still realize a 15-20% IRR but only in the case that its operating
margins remain stable and/or increase. There is little evidence that supports the conclusion above
and substantial pricing pressure implies the strong possibility of falling margins in several
segments. In a true “worst case” scenario with Dell’s market share and margins declining, it is
almost impossible to even realize a positive IRR. Despite Dell’s acquisitive streak in the past, its
acquisitions have historically had low yields to substantially make a difference to its bottom line
to the IRR in this transaction.
7.2 Market Overview:
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Dell’s market share has declined across most of its customer segments as desktop and laptop
shipments have stagnated or increase modestly over the past 4 years.
In my finding, the “base case” scenario assumes relatively flat total market sizes and a drop of 12% in Dell’s shares over the next five years. The Channel checks document has information that
clearly indicates the substantial pricing pressure in both these markets.
However, Dell’s Servers and Networking and Services segment have experience great growth:

Indications from the Channel checks show that Dell is very strong in both of these markets and
its market share in the Servers and Networking segment will continue to increase in the next five
years.
7.3 Dell’s Competition:
Dell’s desktop and laptop segments have the most competition. Channel checks have indicated
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that Dell’s products are regarded only as commodities and have little competitive advantage. HP,
IBM, Oracle, SAP pose substantial threat to Dell’s services and software business however IT
manager customers mostly agree that it is easier to differentiate and bundle solutions in that
segment to sell products. It is also unclear of Dell’s performance as an end-to-end IT solution
provider vs. IBM and IP. Historically, Dell has sold only through a direct sales force and its
experience is limited in the fields of cooperation with value-added resellers (VARs). Another
thing unclear is whether the cloud-based solutions or virtual solutions run on company-owned
hardware will dominate in the future. In the case that cloud-based solutions win, Dell’s strategy
will not work out well in its favor. There is also massive growth in the tablets world with Apple,
Google, Samsung continuously improving and releasing new products. Dell however, is a very
late mover in this.
7.4 Growth Opportunities:
It is unreasonable to expect much growth in the laptop or desktop segments at best and perhaps
0% to 1-2% growth even in optimistic scenarios. The best growth opportunities for Dell lies in
its Servers and Networking segment with potential increase in market share. The upwards trend
in its Services revenue through more bundle sales and expansion overseas is also a positive sign
for Dell’s growth. Its indirect sales growth for Software/ IT solutions and its large value
acquisitions such as the Quest and Perot forebodes potential growth for Dell in the years to
come. Dell’s tablet growth potential, although is still behind its competitor, is very noticeable:
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The question arises: How will Dell be able to differentiate itself from competitors such as Apple,
Google and Samsung?
7.5 Other Factors:
Michael Dell’s rollover and ownership percentage, going from 15% to 75%, brings up serious
questions about his true motivations. He also missed key trends upon retirement in 2004,
prevented acquisitions for several years, and upon his return to the company, took Dell into the
“end-to-end solutions provider” game at a very late stage of the company. The unclear future of
what Microsoft’s role will be as a result of its $2 billion subordinated note investment in the deal
could be significant boost to Dell’s hardware or inconsequential. Going private would not make
a huge difference for Dell, and might actually impede its goals since it will have more difficulty
in accessing capital and doing large acquisitions. Although, Dell will no longer be accountable to
institutional shareholders, Silver Lake partners are unlikely to contribute significant equity given
their impact on IRR. HP and IBM transformed as public companies and the question is why does
Dell need to be private to do this?
7.6 Operating Scenarios:
Base Case Revenue Margins:
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The operating scenarios are most likely to be somewhere in between the Street consensus case
and the Base Case.
CONSERVATIVE CASE:

THE STREET CONSENSUS CASE:

BASE CASE:
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UPSIDE CASE:

7.7 Unpredictability of the Margins:
Dell breaks out Operating Income by customer segments and not by products segment (at least,
not officially or not in the past year):
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No information is released on Gross Margin, Operating Margin for Servers & Networking,
Laptops and Desktops segment. Also, no information is disclosed on margins by product:

7.8 Conclusion on Margins:
“Consumer” segment has very little contribution to Operating Income, which means that declines
in Desktops and Laptops may not be that significant. However, over 50% of Operating Income
currently comes from “End User Computing” (mostly those two segments), so still significant
enough for parties to be concerned over pricing pressure and falling market share. Furthermore,
LBO analysis is highly sensitive to margins and even a 1% decline in Operating Margin would
reduce IRR by close to 10%. As seen in the next few slides, declines in market share and/or
market size in Dell’s top three segments matter much less than its ability to maintain or increase
its margins. However, with almost no data or insight into that, it is very hard to make a strong
recommendation in favor of this deal.
7.9 The Numbers that work in Dell’s favors
Sources and Uses and IRSS in Base Case Scenario (with two smaller add-on acquisitions of $1.5
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billion and $2.0 billion):

Even in the Downside Case:
If Dell’s 3 top markets (Servers & Networking, Desktops, and Laptops) all decline by 10% per
year (close to a 50% cumulative decline from Year 1 to Year 5) and its share stays roughly the
same in each market:
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A potential 10-15% IRR is still not a total disaster but all of this assumes that its margin will
increase by 1-2% over these five years, despite all the declining market sizes and stagnating
shares.
7.10 Why the Numbers work:
The numbers work primarily because the company generates more than $3.0-3.5 billion in Free
Cash Flow each year, even under pessimistic assumptions for market size growth and Dell’s own
share in each market. In addition, prior to the deal, it traded at an EV / EBITDA multiple of 3.9x
(5.1 times purchase multiple), meaning that the yield is much higher than it would be for
companies that are in healthier conditions. Plus, I am assuming that Dell repatriates close to $10
billion of overseas cash and puts it to use financing approximately $6 billion of the purchase
price (after taxes owed on this cash). And then Michael Dell is rolling over all his equity, and the
leverage ratio is fairly aggressive at 5.3x TTM EBITDA. The bottom line is that Silver Lake is
contributing very little of its own equity ($1.3-$1.4 billion) for Free Cash Flow of several times
that each year – even with no growth and multiple contraction, that is a winning formula.
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About the Margins:
Base Case Scenario, Gross Margins and Operating Margins stay the same rather than increasing
by 2% over the 5 years:

And if Gross Margin falls by less than 1% and EBIT Margin declines by 1.5%:
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The Downside Cases:
The Street Consensus Case:

Own Downside Case:

The question becomes: “Will Margins really fall?”
That is the main point of this deal, which is very difficult to say with the limited information in
hand. If “End User Computing” really contributes over 50% of Operating Income and the
company comes under even more price pressure there, margins could easily fall. Increasing
software/services revenue would help, but those segments are not growing quickly enough to
offset the decline in Operating Income from desktops and laptops. This means that there is not
much of a margin of safety for this deal in case everything goes wrong. I have used most of the
excess cash to fund the initial deal, and even add-on acquisitions will not help much so this is a
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case where the deal could potentially work well, but also where the “Downside” cases are too
extreme to overlook.
“Will acquisitions help?”
Base Case Sensitivities for Acquisition Size and Operating Income Yield

Where margins stay the same:

Bigger acquisitions generally reduce IRR because Silver Lake chips in more equity – would only
improve things at higher yields of above 15-20%.
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7.11 Hypothesis: The criteria to make this deal work:
1) Certainty in the maintenance or increase of margins, which will increase the margin of
safety
2) Detailed breakout of Operating Income by product segment and if the decline in desktops
and laptops did not make a substantial difference:

3) Clear buyer for Dell’s entire business in several years because selling off business lines
separately is very hard.
4) If there were several other viable acquisition targets (that had not already been acquired
by IBM or HP) that could be acquired for < 5-6x EBIT and contribute substantially to
Dell’s net income.
Southeastern’s Valuation:
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Dell probably is worth more than $13.65 per share since net cash alone accounts for more than
$3.50 of that value. However, $24.00 per share seems quite optimistic, perhaps something in the
$15.00 - $20.00 range (and the LBO still works in that range). Biggest question arises is the true
value of those acquisitions since 2008 and what segments they contributed to and can the
different business units be sold off separately?
7.12 Conclusions:
I recommend against the deal and acquiring Dell in a Leveraged Buyout (LBO) transaction, due
to uncertainty around margins and the inability to make high-yielding add-on acquisitions. Most
commentary focused on the decline in the desktop and laptop markets, but those are far less
significant than even slight margin changes. Client computing is lower margin but it still
contributes over one-third of Dell’s Free Cash Flow, if not more. Despite Dell’s claims of 15%
IRR on its acquisitions, its most recent deals have yielded less than 5% Operating Income. The
question then becomes will future deals really help? In more optimistic scenarios, IRR numbers
look very positive. However, if the situation becomes worse, in which market sizes and margins
decline, investors have very little protection and far too much downside risk. If additional data /
insight into margins by segment and trends are provided, I might change this conclusion, but this
is my current view.
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8.0 Closing Remarks:
Without the help of Professor John Hasseldine, professionals from Ho Chi Minh Securities
Corporation, as well as the online detailed instructions from the Financial Modeling course
Breaking into Wall Street, I would not be able to finish this project within the Fall Semester
2013. Throughout the process of building this Dell – Silver Lake LBO model, I was introduced
to new technical skills, especially Excel and financial modeling, which would prove to be
applicable to my future internships and jobs. In addition, my writing skill was honed throughout
the process and I have developed great researching and data mining skills when scrutinizing
earning calls/reports/and SEC documents.
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